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Abstract 
This article invesitgates the processes of ethnic segmentation, precarious 
labour, and informalization in the Swedish taxi industry during a period 
of rapid deregulation during the 1990s. It does so by focussing on the life 
story of a single individual―Adem, a taxi driver in the Swedish city of 
Malmö. Despite his education, long working experience, and all efforts to 
make use of these advantages, all doors to an appropriate career in 
Sweden have remained closed to him. As a result, he has been pushed into 
working in the taxi sector, which is increasingly characterized by ethnic 
segmentation, hard working conditins, and harsh competition, forcing 
people to deploy informal economic strategies in order to survive. Adem’s 
fate becomes strongly determined by these socio-economical processes. 
At the same time, the article shows that these processes are not separate, 
but are closely interrelated and reinforce each other. On the broader level 
these processes are a general consequence of the neoliberal 
reconstruction of Western economies, and structural economic, political 
and social changes related to it.  
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Introduction  
During my fieldwork in Malmö, I used a taxi more often than usual. I 
needed to meet several informants who lived or worked in different parts 
of the city. Taxis were the most efficient means of transport to get the job 
done. But perhaps the most important reason was the cost. An increasing 
number of taxi companies at the time charged only 45 kronor (US$5.50) 
for all destinations within the city, which was actually a price my 
employers were prepared to pay. But this extremely low price was also 
something that I thought about every time while being driven. Three 
thoughts usually circulated in my mind. 
First, this situation reminded me of Portes’ story (1994:426) 
about the informalization of local transport in Miami. Local regular bus 
lines, employing union organized, mostly white, drivers were competing 
with the so-called jitneys, which were small and overcrowded, had no air-
conditioning, and were driven almost exclusively by immigrants. The 
service of the regular lines was indeed better: the buses were more 
comfortable, with air conditioners; but they were also more expensive, 
more infrequent, and stopped only at stations. The jitneys were cheaper, 
the service was more frequent and they used to stop wherever the 
customer wanted. Portes concluded that the competition between the 
controlled and irregular economy had never been as apparent as in this 
case. The same can therefore be said for the Malmö taxi situation. Cheap 
taxis are almost exclusively operated by immigrants, and they have 
multiplied so much that it is almost impossible to charge higher prices. 
The quality of service is perhaps somewhat lower―drivers may not have 
mastered the language and the cars are somewhat older and dirtier―but 
the client does not have to wait more than three minutes and the service 
is inexpensive. But, as we shall see later in this article, it is impossible for 
these firms to get bigger and better paid jobs, such as a contract with the 
bigger, luxurious hotels in the city, or fixed agreements with the 
municipality or county for transporting patients, the elderly and so on. 
Such contracts are almost exclusively reserved for larger and more 
established taxi companies. 
Secondly, each time during the ride I tried to calculate how many 
fares taxi drivers have to take during the day to make it all worthwhile. 
Responding to my phone call, picking me up, taking me to the 
destination―an average ride can hardly be shorter than half an hour. This 
meant that they could not earn more than 100 kronor (US$12) per hour. 
If they worked twelve hours a day, six days a week―about 26 working 
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days a month―then the overall revenue per month might come to a 
maximum of 31,400 kronor (US$3,750). Once they had paid for leasing 
the car, daily fuel, the dispatch centre service, plus car maintenance and 
washing, and payroll tax, what remained was far below the guaranteed 
lowest wages for employees in Sweden. And all this despite working a 
twelve-hour day, six days a week. 
And finally, a third thing I started thinking about was the informal 
economy, or “black economy” (svart ekonomi), as this phenomenon is 
usually called in the political and media vocabulary in Sweden. When it 
comes to taxi fraud, according to the Swedish Taxi Association 
(Taxiförbundet 2014), more than 30 billion kronor in taxes have been lost 
since the taxi market was deregulated in 1990. These figures should, 
however, be taken with some caution. For instance, during the 1990s and 
early 2000s both authorities (SOU 2004-102; Skatteverket 2005) and 
media estimated that annual tax evasion came to four billion kronor in 
the taxi sector. The current estimate is one billion kronor (Taxiförbundet 
2011). Despite the variations, there is a sort of general consensus that tax 
fraud is widespread within this sector, which is also often associated with 
other serious types of crime such as rape and robbery. 
Through these short reflections I actually arrived at three key-
words related to three socio-economic processes with which this article is 
going to deal. These are first the process of ethnification or ethnic 
segmentation of the taxi industry; secondly, the process of precarization, 
or progressive worsening of working conditions and reduction of 
(welfare) protection for employees; and thirdly the process of 
informalization within the sector: that is, increasing the volume of work 
done outside society’s existing regulatory framework.  
In other words, by using the life story of a single taxi driver in 
Malmö as an empirical base, the article aims to show how the radical 
worsening of working conditions within the sector was accompanied by 
two additional processes―ethnic segmentation and informalization―and 
how these three processes are not separate but closely interrelated and 
reinforce each other.  
 
Deregulation 
Deregulation of the Swedish taxi sector (implemented on 1 July, 1990) 
was in fact the beginning of an extensive deregulatory wave in Sweden 
during the 1990s, when a number of strictly regulated economic sectors 
(electricity, domestic air traffic, postal services, rail and taxi services and 
telecommunications) were opened to the “free market.” Being considered 
a test case to prepare for later deregulations (Laitila et al. 1995:9), taxi 
deregulation was planned and organized very carefully. Among other 
things, all parts of the project were implemented on the same day (Marell 
& Westin 2000, 2002).  
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The main political argument behind deregulation was the low 
efficiency and high prices that had previously characterised the taxi 
market. Deregulation was expected to provide the necessary conditions 
for achieving a better balance between supply and demand, resulting in 
lower fares and a higher quality of service. Furthermore, competition was 
expected to improve efficiency, which in the longer run would decrease 
the number of smaller actors in the market, and at the same time increase 
the number of larger operators, who could than take advantage of 
economies of scale (NUTEK 1996).  
However, in reality the market was liberalized: that is to say, 
formal measures of state regulations were removed, but better efficiency 
was not achieved. What really happened was a lowering of effectiveness 
in terms of the decreasing number of rides per vehicle and per working 
day and even time-productivity (the relationship between paid time and 
total working time) decreased (Laitila et.al. 1995). The resulting lower 
profitability forced people to work longer hours to earn the same wage. 
Simultaneously a new wage system for taxi drivers, a so-called “payment 
by result” (NUTEK 1996) was introduced, which meant that, especially 
within the larger taxi companies, the higher costs caused by the low 
effectiveness tended to be transferred to the employees, that is to say, the 
taxi drivers.  
All this created conditions for the three inter-dependent 
processes with which this article is concerned: ethnic segmentation, 
precarious labour, and informalization. These matters will be discussed 
within the geographically limited area of Malmö/Lund, and through the 
life story of a single immigrant taxi driver.  
The biographical method provides a useful tool for studying 
structure-agency dynamics, especially in the interdisciplinary studies of 
migration, ethnic business, and labour markets. When people choose to 
tell researchers their life stories it becomes possible to reconstruct those 
structural institutional and cultural patterns that constitute their 
biographies (Rosenthal 1993). A biographical-narrative interview that 
this article is based on was made as a part of my field work on ethnic 
business in Malmö, in the end of the first decade of 2000s. 
 
Ethnic segmentation  
Relying on the classic theory of a dual labour market (Reich, Gordon and 
Edwards 1973), Michael Piore (1979) argued in his concept of ethnic 
segmentation that international migration is caused in the first place by 
the demand for cheap and disposable labour in advanced capitalist 
economies rather than by social and economic processes in the countries 
that export labour. Secondly, he linked migration to the segmentation of 
labour markets. Indeed, immigrants most often become part of a 
secondary labour market, thereby providing more jobs and job security 
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for the local population which mostly occupies the primary labour 
market.  
There is a vast literature showing that Piore’s segmentation 
theory is still relevant. It shows that changes in immigration policy 
towards tighter control are linked to the wider political and economic 
processes of the withdrawal of the welfare state, erosion of social rights, 
and labour re-commodification (Slavnic 2010; Munck et al. 2011). These 
policy changes have not prevented or even reduced immigration, but 
criminalized it instead (Jordan & Düvell 2002; Anderson 2010), placing 
immigrants in a vulnerable, “precarious legal status” (Bernhard et al. 
2007). The increased insecurity and legal uncertainty during the 
immigration process determines their position in the labor market even 
after they have resolved their legal status and become “full citizens” 
(Anderson 2010; Goldring & Landolt 2011). Their precarious citizenship 
status continues to overshadow chances in the labor market (Munck et al. 
2011), by providing opportunities to their employers to continue to 
exploit them (Jordan & Düvell 2002; Wright & McKay 2007). The life story 
that is the empirical foundation of this article is in many aspects quite 
illustrative of these processes. 
Adem is 52 years old and a trained electrical engineer. He came to 
Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s as a war refugee from Bosnia.1 In 
his homeland he had over many years built his career in a large company 
that competed internationally, operating within the same market as 
Sweden’s ASSEA (today ABB). Once in Sweden, he applied for more than 
200 jobs, but without success. He was not even called for a single 
interview. His disappointment was at its peak after an event that he 
describes as follows: 
In the municipality of Arbåga there is an ABB factory 
producing high-voltage equipment. They announced a job 
vacancy for an electrical engineer. The ad matched so well 
to me and my qualifications that I myself could not have 
written a better prescription. It was exactly what I had 
previously dealt with, i.e. high voltage devices and their 
installation… And I applied immediately. I thought to 
myself that if I could get this job it would be brilliant. As I 
said, the job was as if it was tailored just for me. Besides, 
the ABB companies are very similar to Energoinvest. They 
were formerly ASSEA, which merged with a Swiss company 
that was named ABB. And coincidently it was ABB that I 
worked with during my time in Libya. For example, while 
we built a substation, ASSEA built an identical one, but with 
a different voltage level, about thirty yards from us. They 
                                                        
1 Above mentioned tighter immigration control in Sweden relates just to 
refugees from the war in former Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990s (see 
Slavnic 2000). 
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transformed for instance 220,000 to 110,000 volts, which 
we later took over, transformed it to 33000 volts before 
distributing it to the places where it was needed. And then 
a few days after I sent in my application, I received a letter 
in which they “thanked me for my interest.” They had 
already hired someone else. Okay, I thought, there is 
nothing to do about it. Such things happen. Just three days 
later, however, I saw exactly the same ad in a newspaper. 
And then I wondered what this was all about. At that time I 
was in fact still unaware of Swedish discrimination, racism 
and so on. I thought instead that they might have needed a 
second engineer for the same post. So I phoned up the 
firm's personnel manager. I noticed immediately in his 
response that he tried to wriggle. Throughout the 
conversation it became increasingly clear that the ad was 
about the same job vacancy that I had already applied for. 
Finally, I asked a direct question: “Have you employed 
anyone following the previous ad?” He said, “No.” “And you 
are now looking for an engineer for the same place?” His 
answer was, “Yes.” I asked if it was worthwhile for me to 
once again submit an application for the post. The answer 
was, “No.” I said, “OK, thank you” and hung up. ... This event 
hit me really hard. 
We can only speculate about the reasons why the employer did not show 
interest in Adem, or even invite him for an interview, in spite of the fact 
that both his formal qualifications and his professional experiences were 
at least compatible and comparable with corresponding Swedish ones. It 
might have been his age, or assumed lack of language and cultural 
competence, or both. It might have been intended discrimination, based 
on ethnical stereotypes and prejudices, or what has been described by 
some scholars as statistical discrimination. It might have been a 
combination of all of these. Anyway, the result was blocked entrance to 
the primary labour market, which would have led to stable employment, 
good working conditions, relatively high wages, and chances of 
advancement.  
In this respect, Adem’s story is just another case supporting the 
findings on ethnic segmentation portrayed by academic literature in 
Sweden.  Immigrants obviously encounter difficulties―both in the process 
of entering the labour market, and within it. When it comes to 
recruitment, despite their equal education, immigrants have a higher 
percentage of unemployment, are employed in unskilled occupations 
(Höglund 2002), or within atypical forms of employment compared with 
the Swedes (Jonsson & Wallette 2001; Håkansson 2001). They are also 
more often excluded from the further recruitment process in the early 
stages (Hertzberg 2003; Neergaard & Mulinari 2004). It is often sufficient 
to have a strange or unusual name to be excluded (Helgesson 2000). 
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Furthermore, immigrants have significantly fewer chances to get jobs that 
are relevant to their qualifications than do Swedes (Martinsson 1998; 
Helgesson 2000). At the same time, such practices of exclusion lead to a 
systematic concentration of immigrants in simple industrial and service 
jobs, with a focus on physically demanding, stressful, or dirty jobs (Alund 
and Schierup 1991; Schierup et al. 2006; Slavnic 2012). Adem’s story is 
quite illustrative of these processes. Soon after the incident mentioned 
above, he was persuaded by his friends to seek a new occupation, to 
become a taxi driver. 
... A friend of mine said to me, “Adem, damn, why do you 
complicate things with all these applications? You have, of 
course, already noticed that it doesn’t lead anybody 
anywhere. Instead, take a job as a taxi driver. Just look at 
me, I have already worked for five or six months. It is 
possible to cope with the job.” So he tried to persuade me. 
And then he said that there were no problems with the job, 
the managers are mainly immigrants. There are also many 
Bosnians employed there who you can work with, which 
makes it all easier. Finally I decided to give it a try. My idea 
was that, during my employment as a taxi driver, I would 
continue to apply for the job I was meant for, electrical 
engineer. It’s true, as my friend said. A few weeks later, 
after I attended a short training course in order to get my 
taxi license, I was employed as a taxi driver. 
There are two things that we learn from this quotation. First, the more 
difficult it is to get a job in the primary labor market, the greater the push 
is to start working in the taxi sector, either as an employee, or as self-
employed. Secondly and related, it gives us some idea of how the process 
of ethnic segmentation works. Slavnic and Urban’s (2008) geographical 
study covering the period 1990-2004 supports this trend by showing that 
the proportion of Swedish-born people working in the taxi industry had 
been constant during the period studied, while participation of the 
foreign-born population in the taxi sector has increased by around 20 per 
cent.  
Adem’s experience fits this trend well. In spite of higher education 
and many years of work experience, for him doors to employment in 
accordance with his qualifications and merits were obviously closed. At 
the same time, after deregulation, entrance-obstacles were removed, 
which enabled relatively easy access to jobs in the taxi industry. But at the 
same time, the sector was increasingly characterized by drastically worse 
working conditions, long workdays, and general uncertainty about the 
future. Testimony to this is offered by Adem’s continued story. 
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Precarious work  
Adem’s first employer was a man who had also come from former 
Yugoslavia, although thirty years earlier. Adem worked for him for about 
a year, six days a week, ten to twelve hours a day. Wednesdays were his 
days off. During the working shifts, time used to pass really quickly. There 
were more than enough calls and he almost never waited for one at the 
taxi depot. About a year later, however, his employer ran into financial 
difficulties. The tax authorities conducted an audit of his firm and decided 
he owed more than 100,000 kronor.2 He was forced to close down his 
business, and Adem found himself back at square one, facing the question: 
"What happens now?" At that time he still used to send job applications to 
companies in the engineering sector, but to no avail. The only solution he 
found reasonable at that point was to start his own taxi firm. He managed 
to get financial support from the state and credit from the bank to buy a 
new car. In order to be legitimate he also needed to complete some sort of 
taxi-specific education: luckily, a short course. Once it was completed, he 
was quickly able to start his business. The period he describes like this: 
I worked as before, approximately ten to twelve hours per 
day, but working for myself I didn’t even have Wednesdays 
off now. I worked every single day. My private affairs I 
performed on the road. For example, if I had to meet with 
the auditor, I waited until a time when I had to go to 
Malmö, where he was located. Before I went off I called him 
to see if he possibly had time to meet. The papers that 
would be needed during the meeting I had with me in the 
car. This was the way things were during the two years I 
was self-employed. The majority of taxi drivers work under 
the same conditions … 
The quote indicates that working conditions within the Swedish taxi 
sector increasingly deteriorated. There are several possible explanations 
for this. The first is an attempt to compensate for lower profitability by 
working longer days and nights―a frequent ploy in the taxi sector (Laitila 
et al. 1995). Unemployment statistics in Sweden since the early 1990s 
show significantly higher unemployment compared with the previous 
period. This means that a large number of individual actors were 
effectively forced to work in the sector despite deteriorating working 
conditions, by accepting longer hours and a lower income, because they 
had nowhere else to go.  Another contributing factor in this context is that 
the taxi industry, as mentioned earlier, moved towards becoming 
ethnically segmented during the same period. To drive a taxi was for 
these people often the only form of paid work that was available. 
                                                        
2 Between 2006 and 2008 the Swedish tax authorities had conducted a so-called 
Taxi project, which resulted in additional taxation of about 280 million kronor, 
affecting about 2,000 companies and 1,400 drivers (Skatteverket 2009). 
Journal of Business Anthropology, 4(2), Fall 2015 
 
 306 
These economic and social processes, however, are not particular 
to the taxi sector alone. If we remain focused on Sweden, we find similar 
trends (to keep the list short) in the household and cleaning sector 
(Gavanas 2010, 2013), the pizza trade (Hultman 2013), seasonal berry 
picking (Woolfson et al. 2012), and construction (Likic-Brboric et al. 
2013). At the same time, the interconnection between migration, ethnic 
segmentation and precarization is related to wider global (neoliberal) 
changes (Hardt and Negri 2000; Harvey 2005; Anderson 2010). 
Precarization includes not only weaker basic socio-economic security 
(Standing 2005 2008), but allows for increased economic exploitation. To 
paraphrase Foti (2005), an increasing number of people who are exposed 
to precarization become “hireable on demand, available on call, 
exploitable at will, and fireable on a whim.” Moreover, this kind of 
exploitation flows over into free time and disrupts “the continuum of 
everyday life” (Tsianos and Papadopoulos 2006).  
The fact that Adem was self-employed does not make any 
difference. During the past three decades, the dominant political, media 
and academic discourses have glorified small firms and their owners as 
major creators of new jobs and growth. Self-employment is, however, 
often less glorious and represents the opposite of standard employment, 
because it provides weak socio-economic security and self-exploitation 
(Edgel 2005; Schierup et al. 2006). This is especially true when 
immigrants start their own small businesses (Slavnic 2004, 2013; Alund 
2003; Abbsian 2003). Research shows that these kinds of owners find 
themselves in a much worse economic situation than immigrants who 
have regular employment (Hjerm 2001, 2004).  
Regarding the taxi sector, Slavnic and Urban (2008) provide some 
empirical evidence for the growing income gap between Swedish-born 
and foreign-born taxi drivers. The foreign-born had an annual income 
that was only 80.3 per cent of the annual income of Swedish-born in 
1991. This difference increased by 2004, when they earned only 68.6 per 
cent of the income of Swedish-born drivers. At the same time, the average 
disposable income in the taxi-sector (regardless of region of birth) has 
been lower than the average for all sectors in Sweden (ibid.:85). However, 
it was still more economically viable for foreign-born people to work in 
the taxi-sector than not to work at all. This explains, at least partly, their 
inclination keep working in the taxi-sector, despite increasingly 
worsening working conditions, and decreasing incomes.  
At the same time, the only competitive strategy that many of these 
operators were able to deploy in order to remain in the market was to 
keep down charges. In Malmö all this started with so-called mini-taxis. I 
asked Adem how the phenomenon of the "mini-taxi" in Malmö began, and 
he said: 
... It all started in 1994, I think. At that time they used those 
little Renault Clio cars. Almost all the first-established mini-
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taxi operators had them. The price for a ride was about 28-
30 kronor. When I started in this business, the price was 
only 35 kronor, then 39, and finally around 45 kronor. 
What was it that made this profitable? Well, it meant that 
people began to travel more by taxi, it was simply cheaper. 
The business idea was thus to keep the car constantly 
running. Since the cars were not expensive, either in terms 
of pricing or service, they were also relatively durable.  
Later this basic business idea got watered down. Suddenly larger cars 
showed up―first Opel Astra and then different kinds of mini-buses. 
Finally, the advantages of low costs were lost altogether. At the same 
time, prices remained low as more and more taxi operators began to 
operate in the same market. The majority of these new players competed, 
however, for private customers, because they had no chance to compete 
for business or government customers. Adem explains it like this: 
... In this sector you are supposed to profile yourself 
according to the customer you want to attract. In 
Malmö/Lund, you have not more than two major taxi 
companies covering perhaps 90 per cent of all business 
customers. Taxi Skåne has over 300 cars. Taxi Kurir is 
another such firm. They are established all over the 
country, and over here they have as many cars as needed. If 
there is a need for as many as 100 cars, they will make sure 
to have that many on the spot. So there is no chance to 
compete with them... since they as a rule get all the big 
contracts… All mini-taxi companies are therefore 
compelled to find their way to retail customers, those who 
do not travel by taxi on a regular basis. There is a 
difference between private customers and business 
customers. The latter do not care―if for example the cost of 
the trip is 100 or 200 kronor, never mind. Comfort and 
punctuality are more important. If a private customer, on 
the other hand, needs to take a taxi from the pub to home, 
and pays out of his own pocket, then it pretty much matters 
if the price is 50 or 100 kronor, you know? 
According to data from the Swedish taxi association (Taxiförbundet 
1998), at the end of the 1990s 55 per cent of the total number of trips 
were so-called “publically funded,” 21 per cent were business trips, and 
only about 24 per cent were private trips. The structure of the market has 
not changed significantly since that time (see Taxiförbundet 2014).  At the 
same time, the total number of taxi companies in Sweden is 
approximately 8,000, operating 14,000 vehicles. Of these, some 6,000 
were companies with only one vehicle and about 1,200 with just two 
vehicles. So more than 8,000 vehicles, that is 60 per cent of all taxi 
vehicles in Sweden, belong to these small firms.  
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Here we need to consider who the main actors in Sweden’s taxi 
industry are. First, there are the drivers (förare)―people employed in one 
of these 8,000 taxi companies. Even firms with only one car employ at 
least one extra driver, in order to improve a car’s efficiency. Second are 
the private taxi companies, just described. The majority of these have only 
one or two cars, while the number of larger companies is actually very 
small. In 2008, there were 69 companies with 10-20 cars and only 41 
companies with more than 20 cars (Taxiförbundet 2008). In fact, the 
largest taxi company in Sweden in 2008 owned not more than 150 cars 
(ibid.). Third, there are the dispatch centres. These normally do not have 
cars, but provide services to taxi companies that are registered under 
their logo. At the time of my research there were about 300 such dispatch 
centres, which included some 80 per cent of all taxi companies in the 
country (Skatteverket, 2009). Dispatch centres are usually registered as 
limited companies, and rarely as economic associations, where the 
owners of taxi companies are also the owners of the centre (although 
some of Sweden's largest dispatch centres―for example, Taxi Stockholm 
and Taxi Göteborg―are registered in this way). All companies registered 
in one dispatch centre have identical logos and telephone numbers on 
their cars, which then gives the impression that these dispatch centres 
(like Taxi Kurir) are large taxi companies owning all these smaller 
companies that operate under their logo. But in fact they are not, even if 
their power and influence of those are quite great, bearing in mind the 
fact that they may often include (and control) several thousand vehicles.  
Companies that do not operate under the umbrella of a centre are 
the so-called free-wheelers (friåkare). The exact number of these is not 
known, but according to data cited in the introduction to this article 
(Bengtsson et al. 2000), in the late 1990s in Malmö about 40 per cent of 
all taxis were run by freewheelers. Since nobody had a monopoly in the 
local market, all companies had to compete for all market niches (ibid.). 
The preceding quote suggests, however, that freewheelers and smaller 
taxi centres were increasingly excluded from the business market. At the 
same time, it seems that competition in this market became additionally 
hard when large established taxi companies from other regions, such as 
Taxi Kurir, started establishing themselves in the Malmö region. This 
intensified competition led to further precarization of the taxi sector and 
increased the risk of raising the number of actors within this sector who 
were ready to employ informal economic methods in conducting their 
work. The next section will address these processes and strategies.  
 
Informal economic strategies 
The basic circumstances that forced Adem to run his business in the way 
he did consisted of blocked access to three-quarters of the market, on the 
one hand, and sharp competition for private customers, on the other. 
Coincidentally, his dispatch centre ran into trouble and the owners were 
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forced to sell the business. Before I present and discuss the strategy 
deployed by the new owners in order to pull the company out of the 
crisis, it is necessary to explain the notion of “an informal economy.”  
An informal economy is traditionally understood as one operated 
primarily by marginal and disadvantaged social groups: in the first place, 
by unemployed poor and immigrants. This is not “the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth” although it is certainly true that 
precarization is related to informalization. According to Tsianos and 
Papadopoulos (2006) the embodied experience of precarity is not only 
characterized by vulnerability (flexibility without protection), 
hyperactivity (constant availability), simultaneity (simultaneous dealing 
with multiple activities), and unsettledness (mobility through different 
space and time lines). It is also characterized by the need to become 
calculating, deceitful, and to cheat.  
It is perhaps also true that members of disadvantaged social 
groups are over-represented in the informal economy, but they are 
certainly not those who make the biggest profit out of it. For example, 
Williams (2014) has shown that unemployed people in the UK earn only 
about one per cent of the total national earnings from informal work, 
while at the same time 97 per cent of total informal earnings is being 
taken by those with formal jobs. Participation in the informal economy in 
fact increases the marginalization of already marginalized social groups 
(ibid.:14).  
In conceptualizing the economic system as either formal or 
informal―where the informal economy is a sort of an anomaly, 
preventing the formal economy from functioning normally― the unity of 
the economic system is overlooked (Leonard 1998; Williams 2014), and 
in turn this tends to over-emphasize the formal nature of our societies 
(Harding and Jenkins 1989).   
Today there is a growing awareness, at least within the academic 
community, that the informal economy is not generated by marginal 
social groups nor by increased immigration. Indeed, it is not an anomaly, 
but an integral part of the formal economy (Sassen 1998; Likic-Brboric et 
al. 2013; Standing 2011). Informalization is related to the capitalist mode 
of production. It is in general the result of a structural conflict between 
old (welfare) modes of regulation and new (neoliberal) regimes of 
accumulation. Essentially, the old regulatory frameworks have become 
too tight for new forms of capital accumulation to be able to expand 
without disruption. Consequently, all economic actors are more likely to 
try to achieve their economic aims outside existing regulatory 
frameworks, in other words, by using informal economic strategies 
(Slavnic 2010).  
The informal economic strategies deployed by powerful social 
actors, such as big businesses and state institutions, have been identified 
as “informalization from above.” At the same time there are informal 
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strategies developed partly as survival strategies, and partly as resistance 
to informalization from above, by small and less powerful actors (small 
business owners and marginalized immigrant entrepreneurs), which have 
been called “informalization from below”(ibid.).  
If we return to the Swedish taxi-sector, the dominant political and 
media discourses define the informal economy as the property of those 
marginal social groups, who are viewed as a major part of that economy 
(Slavnic 2011). At the same time, the media make a clear distinction 
between so-called seriös3 taxi companies (and dispatch centres) and 
companies that are prone to illegal activities. This tendency to criminalize 
small taxi companies and freewheelers is extensively used by large 
companies as part of their business strategy, in order to run the small 
operators out of the market. They usually present themselves (and most 
media and political actors accept this new discourse as the truth) as a 
priori decent economic actors who have in fact been most severely 
harmed by irregularities within the taxi sector. Their actual motives, 
however, are not a desire for justice and order, but rather their strong 
interest in out-competing their competitors and thereby capturing 
monopolistic positions in the market (ibid.). This kind of strategy is 
nothing other than “informalization from above.”4  
Smaller companies (and dispatch centres) in turn seek to get rid of 
being labeled as oseriös,5 partly by (over)investing in external features 
that they perceived characterize a seriös company. They understand that 
this is characterized by significantly higher prices and better service, 
which is often reflected in the fact that drivers have uniforms. But, as 
Adem’s story shows, it is not always enough just to have the intention to 
become a seriös taxi firm. He describes how the new owners, making an 
effort to pull the dispatch centre out of its crisis, actually pushed it even 
further into the mire. 
They tried to bring order into the company. …The first 
change they introduced was to raise prices. Then they 
raised the price for being connected to their dispatch 
centre. They also introduced a rule on uniforms, inspired 
by Taxi Skåne. To me the uniform issue was less important, 
but they thought it was the most important change and it 
was almost only this issue that used to be discussed during 
our regular monthly meetings. Has the driver worn a tie, 
was the tie neat and tidy, and so on. At the same time, the 
real problems were growing. One was that we certainly lost 
up to 60 per cent of all the customers we had ever had. 
                                                        
3 Swedish idiom, meaning serious, describing decent, law-obiding companies; 
4 For more detailed discussion of the concept “informalization from above” see 
Slavnic, 2010 and Slavnic, forthcomoing 2016; 
5 Swedish idiom, meaning un-serious, describing, fraudulent, deceitful companies; 
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Why? Simply because this clientele was made up of retirees 
and students, meaning people with tight finances. Prior to 
the changes, our low prices at about 39 kronor per ride, 
with the longer journeys being slightly more expensive, 
were acceptable. The price would only be slightly more 
expensive than travelling by bus, and so of course they 
would call a taxi. Even pensioners thought the prices were 
affordable. With higher prices, however, one could see 
clearly how this customer base started disappearing.  
This and similar situations led to a number of cases of illegitimate 
competition, even among colleagues from the same dispatch centre. Adem 
describes a few such cases: 
What was the result of this? Well, when enough work is no 
longer available for all, some drivers manage to retain part 
of their daily income, while others earn less and less 
money. Who are those who keep their incomes? Well, they 
are those who cheat, who steal others' customers, they are 
such people. 
ZS: What do you mean by stealing customers? 
Adem: Yes, they simply steal customers. In this business, 
there are many thieves. We all had a rule about how strong 
the radio transmitters in the cars could be, but some 
drivers tuned theirs to a very strong broadcasting signal, so 
strong that only their signal was visible on the taxi centre's 
computer screen. Or another such typical case was when 
the taxi centre sent me to take a run from Gunnesbo, while 
another driver was there in the vicinity. For me it would 
perhaps take about 6-7 minutes to get to the site, while for 
him it would only take half a minute. Under our current 
rules the cars that are in motion do not have the right to 
take these trips, only the cars waiting at the centre. But it 
often happened that they did pick up customers anyway, as 
in my case. And then a few minutes later I showed up over 
there like a fool. 
ZS: But you never know who's picked up your client? 
Adem: You can find out if you have time to do it, but it is not 
always easy―especially if the customer was already 
waiting for a taxi when he shows up. He picks up the 
customer directly and disappears.  
This was an obvious example of unfair and cruel competition, based on 
informal strategies which are part of the struggle for survival among most 
marginalized groups and individuals in the labour market and are part of 
informalization from below. They were used as a last resort in the 
struggle for survival, in a situation where all other opportunities to 
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survive in the "formal" economy were closed. A similar conclusion from 
their study of the informal strategies of taxi drivers in a small English 
town, Moonhaven, is drawn by Jordan and Travers (1998). They write 
that these are rational economic actions performed in response to 
structural constraints that arise as a consequence of changes that occur 
within the so-called formal economy. At the same time, since this strategy 
is actually the only way to survive, it cannot be seen as immoral by those 
who carry it out. Moralizing in this context could be perceived as 
hypocrisy, and not as legitimate criticism (ibid.: 298). 
In any case, when it comes to Adem, he eventually decided to close 
down his company. When I asked him about the real causes behind this 
decision, he answered:  
The key reasons were several. The first was the poor 
profitability in the third year, which was the result of the 
bad business policy and working conditions in the taxi 
association. And the second reason was that I really got 
tired. I got tired of both exhausting work and working 
conditions, but also of the taxi profession as such. It's 
incredibly tough to drive taxis for a long time, especially 
mini-taxis… In my case it worked out that during one run 
I’d get a second booking, and then during the second run, 
I’d book a third, and that was the way it was going all day. 
You had to constantly keep in mind all these things, and I 
was constantly under stress. Taxi business really kills one, 
wears out one... 
This quotation in a way sums up the message that Adam wanted to give 
me, but also summarizes academic points that this article wishes to 
communicate. The gospel of flexibilization, as Standing (2011:24) puts it, 
tells people that they have to obey market forces and always be available 
and endlessly adaptable. Adem tells us nevertheless that nobody can do it 
indefinitely. In other words, there is a fundamental contradiction between 
neoliberal (unlimited) demand for flexibility and human beings limited 
capability to fulfill this demand. Unless they employ informal economic 
strategies that in this case become a rational response to structural 
downward pressure towards greater flexibility, which these individuals 
are not able to resist. The other alternative, which Adem chose, was to 
give up.  
My last question to Adem was what he thought about the current 
situation in the taxi industry in general and in particular about the 
situation in Malmö/Lund: 
Listen, what happens in this industry is not a coincidence... 
There are many people, especially down here in southern 
Sweden, who cannot find a job… Almost all are highly 
educated … but they could not obtain employment 
commensurate with their level of competence and were 
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therefore forced to take up employment in the taxi 
industry. For society, it was some sort of safety valve. It 
was better that these people took employment as taxi 
drivers than to stroll through the employment agencies, or 
in the streets or even end up in newspapers articles about 
crime or abuse. The state is looking through its fingers; all 
sorts of problematic business strategies within the sector 
are tolerated to keep these people in some sort of 
employment. 
This brings us to the role of the state in this context. Adem is quite 
confident―even categorical―in his assessment of the situation, asserting 
that the state tolerates informal economic strategies in the taxi sector, as 
a sort of “labour market policy measure.” Moreover, he is not the only one 
who thinks so. Several of my informants, involved in or related to the taxi 
industry, have given me similar assessments.  
During the past fifteen years, for instance, several commissions 
have been appointed by the Government6 or different state 
agencies/departments7 charged with investigating irregularities in the 
taxi sector. But, despite these investigations clearly pointing out the 
problems within the taxi industry as well as proposals for how to deal 
with them, the Government has actually done nothing concrete.   
An example of this is the proposal for special de-tanking centres 
(or reporting centres for taxis, as they are called in most recent 
documents), where the data from all taximeters were to be registered and 
saved. The proposal was first presented in 1997, but in SOU 1999:60 it 
was officially offered as a strategy for dealing with tax evasion in the taxi 
sector.  
This particular story has been going on for the past seventeen 
years, covering two mandates of social democratic government and 
additionally two mandates of centre-right coalition government. 
Throughout this period basically all relevant actors―media, various state 
agencies (among others the Competition Board and the National Tax 
Agency), trade unions and branch associations―repeatedly pressed the 
state to implement effective legislation in order to do something about 
these problems. Politicians have nevertheless ignored all these claims.  
Eventually, after continuous political demand, underpinned by a 
                                                        
6 SOU 1997:111, Branschsanneringsutredningen; SOU 1999:60, Taxiutredning 
”Kundvänligare taxi”; SOU 2004:102 Ekonomisk brottslighet inom taxibranschen; 
SOU 2010:76 Transportstyrelsens databaser på vägtrafikområdet―integritet och 
effektivitet. 
7 Redovisningscentraler för taxi―Ds 2013:66, Departementsserien (Ds) 5 
november 2013; Näringsdepartementet; Skatteverket (2008); Skattefelskarta för 
Sverige, (2008:1); Skatteverket (2014) Skattefelets utveckling i Sverige 2007–
2012. Note that these two reports, made by the Swedish tax agency, deal with tax 
evasion in all economic sectors, including the taxi sector.  
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number of reports issued by various organisations, agencies and 
institutions, on 25 July,, 2012 the government appointed yet another 
commission to investigate the possibility of establishing reporting centres 
for taxis. The findings were presented in February 2013 and led to a new 
Law on reporting centres. The parliamentary decision was made on 10 
July, 2014, and the Law should come into force on 1 January, 2016. 
This looks like the end of this story. From 2016, the state is 
expected to collect at least one billion kronor more each year in income 
tax, and taxi customers may expect to have better and safer services. But 
there are rumours within the taxi sector about the newest technical 
solutions making it possible both to order the nearest taxi cab and to pay 
for the service via a smart phone app (Taxiförbundet 2014b). Certain 
groups within the sector are said to believe that this new technology 
makes taxi meters useless and unnecessary. This seems to confirm the 
view that the state is purposefully ignoring the problems within the taxi 
sector. The Law on reporting centres has been approved only now, when 
it is practically impossible for it to be implemented.  
But this article has actually presented the opposite example (Taxi 
project 2006-2008), showing how tax authorities deployed decisive 
measures in order to clean up the taxi sector. Therefore, the only safe 
conclusion may be that state policy in this context has been quite 
ambivalent, inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory. In fact, there is 
nothing peculiar in this, because the story of the Swedish taxi sector’s de-
regulation is, in this way, also a story about the neoliberal reconstruction 
of the Swedish welfare state. Such large structural changes are always 
accompanied by internal conflicts between old and new ideologies, old 
and new moralities, old and new policies. In the course of time new 
(neoliberal) ideology, morality and policies have become dominant, 
creating a new social order (Dumenil and Levi 2002) in which Adem’s life 
story is embedded. 
 
Concluding discussion 
This article has dealt with the socio-economic consequences of the rapid 
deregulation of the Swedish taxi-sector during the 1990s through the 
experience of a single immigrant taxi driver, as these effects were 
manifested in the geographical region of Malmö-Lund. As we have seen, 
the fate of Adem is strongly determined by structural changes in the 
economy and new (neoliberal) economic trends. 
Although highly educated and with long working experience 
behind him, all doors to an appropriate career in Sweden remain closed to 
Adem. At the same time, thanks to deregulation and the removal of most 
entry barriers, it was relatively easy for him to establish a taxi business. 
This sector, however, became increasingly run by “pure” market forces, 
characterized by harsh competition, extreme deterioration of working 
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conditions, and growing uncertainty. Consequently, the sector became 
less attractive for all those who were able to find a job in any more 
lucrative industry, while at the same time it has also become the last 
refuge for the most vulnerable individuals and groups in society, who do 
not have that chance.  
On a broader level, the present processes of growing ethnic 
segmentation and precarization are intimately related to the rise of 
neoliberal capitalism, for which migration serves as an important vehicle 
by making the labour markets more flexible and reducing the cost of 
labour (Munck et al. 2011, 254–255; see also Schierup & Alund 2014). 
Mass migration still appears to be a necessary condition for capital 
accumulation (Hardt & Negri 2000; Bauder 2006). Or, to put it more 
accurately, it is not immigration and immigrants as such that contribute 
to capital accumulation, but their precarious position in the labour 
market, which makes them attractive to a capitalist economy. “[T]hey are 
valuable just because they are vulnerable” (Bauder 2006:22). By being 
systematically pushed into the secondary sectors of the labour market, 
migrants help stabilize it for non-migrants (ibid.:23). At the same time, 
and in the long run, they also help the neoliberal reconstruction of the 
labour market, which means worse working conditions and poorer work 
protection for all (Standing 2011).  
This article also questions a common taken-for-granted “truth” 
about the informal economy: its causes and carriers. Normally 
informalization is regarded as a salient feature for marginalized and 
disadvantaged social groups. In sharp contrast to these views, this article 
offers an alternative explanation: informalization in Western economies 
is a general consequence of the deep economic, political and social 
changes that characterize such societies, generally described as “post-
Fordist transformation.” Informalization is a result of a structural conflict 
between new, neoliberal economic trends and old (welfare) regulatory 
frameworks. However, the resulting processes of welfare state 
retrenchment, economic deregulation, labour market, and labour 
flexibilization and re-commodification, do not affect all private and public 
economic sectors, or all individuals and social groups, equally. Some of 
them become more exposed to these processes, some less. What actually 
happens is that grey zones within national economies are being 
constituted―grey zones which are especially exposed to precarization 
and informalization and in which economic actors cannot survive without 
employing informal economic strategies. As these zones grow, they tend 
to absorb the most exposed individuals and social groups— in Sweden’s 
case the immigrants. 
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